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Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the
Legitimacy of International Courts?
Nienke Grossman*

Abstract

International courts are plqying an increasingly important role in deciding international
disputes and in defining the content rf international law. Yet women make up onlY a meager
percentage cf international court judges. This Article explores the relationship between the
paucity rf women judges and the legitimary rf international courts. After providing statistics on
women's partictpation on eleven rf the world's most important courts and tribunals, the Article
argues that under-representation rf one sex tiffects the normative legitimary rf international
courts because it endangers impartiality and introduces bias when men and women approach
judging differentlY. Even if men and women do not "think differentlY, " a sex un-representative
bench harms sociological legitimary]or constituencies who believe thry do nonetheless. For groups
traditionallY excluded from international lawmaking or historicallY discriminated against,
inclusion likelY strengthens sociological legitimary, while continued exclusion perpetuates
conclusions about unfairness. FinallY, sex representation is important to the normative
legitimary cf international courts because representation is an important democratic value. Sex
representation mqy endanger sociological legitimary, however,]or constituencies who associate
authority with male judges or if women judges are unqualified or perceived as less qualified.

Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; LLM 2009, Georgetown University
Law Center; JD 2004, Harvard Law School; BA 1999, Harvard College. The author wishes to
thank Harlan Cohen, Richard Fallon, Claudio Grossman, Craig Martin, William Mock, CJ. Peters,
Mortimer Sellers, Markus Wagner, the SEALS New Scholars Workshop, the Junior International
Law Scholars Association Workshop, and the University of Baltimore Junior Faculty Forum for
comments and feedback on this article. She also wishes to thank Kristin Drake and Joshua
Hoffman for their valuable research assistance and the University of Baltimore School of Law for
its generous summer research grant.

647

Chicago Journal ifInternational Law

Table of Contents
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 648

II. Women on International Courts: The Numbers .............................................. 652
III. Sex Representation Matters to Normative Legitimacy When Men
and Women "Think Differendy" ............................................................... 654
N. Sex Representation Matters to Sociological Legitimacy Because
People Believe Men and Women "Think Differendy" ........................... 660
A. The International Criminal Tribunals ............................................................ 661
B. Traditionally Discriminated or Excluded Groups and Perceptions
of Bias ............................................................................................................. 664
V. Sex Representation, Democratic Values, and Legitimacy ............................... 668
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 675

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 2010, Xue Hanqin and Joan E. Donoghue were sworn
in as judges on the International Court of Justice (lCJ). For the first time in its
sixty-five year history, two women judges are serving simultaneously on the
fifteen-member bench. 1 Only one woman-Rosalyn Higgins-precedes them. 2
The appointment of the second and third woman ever to serve on the Court is
an important milestone, but women still make up only 13 percent of the IC]'s
bench. 3
The paucity of women judges is not unique to the IC). Although women
account for almost half of the world's population,4 they rarely make up even
close to 50 percent of judges on the world's most important international

International Court of Justice (lC]), Press Release, Swearing-in of Two New Members of the Court at a
Public
Sitting,
No
2010/29
(Sept
10,
2010),
online
at
http://www.icjcij.org/presscom/ files/3/16093.pdf (visited Oct 11, 2011).
Dapo Akande, Two Women Nominated to Replace Retiring US and Chinese Judges on the International Court
ofJustice (Updated) (EJIL Analysis June 22, 2010), online at http://www.ejiltalk.org/two-womennominated-to-replace-retiring-us-and-chinese-judges-on-the-international-court-of-justice/
(visited Nov 19, 2011).
As this article went to press, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council
elected Julia Sebutinde, a Ugandan female judge, to the IC] bench. She is expected to become the
Court's fourth permanent female judge in February 2012. IC], Press Release, United Nations
General AssemblY and Security Council elect Ms Julia Sebutinde as a Member of the Court, No. 2011/39
(Dec 15,2011), online at www.icj-cij.org/presscom/flles/5/16855.pdf(visited Dec 23, 2011).
The ratio of men to women in 2008 was 1.02:1. United Nations Statistics Division, World
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online at http://www.geohive.com/earth/pop-.gender.aspx
(visited Oct 11,2011).
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adjudicative bodies. s Until Elsa Kelly's appointment on October 1, 2011, no
female judge ever served on the twenty-one member bench of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).6 Only four women serve on the
twenty-seven member bench of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).7 In 2009,
only 9 percent of arbitrators in International Centre for Setdement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitrations were women. s Strikingly, of eleven
courts surveyed/ women outnumbered men only on one: the International
Criminal Court (ICC).lO
Reflecting the general population's sex ratio-or "sex representation"-on
international court benches may matter for any number of reasons. This Article
explores the relationship between sex representation and legitimacy of
international adjudication. Understanding what drives legitimacy is essential to
those interested in protecting both judicial institutions and the law they interpret
and apply. Not only is international adjudication an exercise of public authority

See Section II.
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Members if the Tribunal Since 1996, online at
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=97&L=0 (visited Oct 11, 2011).
Court of Justice of the European Union, Members, online at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcms/J02_7026/ (visited May 21, 2010).
This statistic was obtained by dividing the number of times women were appointed to sit on
panels by the total number of arbitrators appointed for cases registered in 2009 for which panels
had been appointed by May 23, 2010. Individuals who served on more than one panel were
counted each time they served on a panel. International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), Ust if Concluded Cases, online at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID /FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionV al= ListConciuded (visited May 26,
2010); ICSID, Ust if Pending Cases, http://icsid.woridbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (visited May 26, 2010). A 2007 study
found only 3.5 percent of investment treaty arbitrators were women. See Susan D. Franck,
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 NC L Rev 1, 81 (2007). See also
Jun Bautista, International Arbitration: Past, Present and Future, Asia Pac Arbitration Rev *8 (2009),
online
at
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/ 12/ sections/ 46/ chapters/ 485/
international-arbitration-past-present-future/ (visited May 21, 2010) (stating that only 14 of 279
ICSID arbitrators were women).
The eleven bodies surveyed are (1) International Court of Justice, (2) International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, (3) European Court of Justice, (4) European Court of Human Rights, (5)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (6) African Court on Human and People'S Rights, (7)
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, (8) World Trade Organization's
Dispute Settlement Body, (9) International Criminal Court, (10) International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, and (11) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
10

International Criminal Court (ICC), Biographical Notes on the Judges, online at http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Sttucture+of+the+Court/ Chambers/The+Judges/ (visited May 21, 2010).
Yet as of October 11, 2011, only two women judges out of nineteen nominees are up for election
to fill six spots opening on the ICC's bench. See ICC, Alphabetical Ust, online at http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ ASP /Elections/Judges/2011/ Alphabetical+listing-2011.htm (visited Oct 11,
2011).

Winter 2012

649

Chicago Journal of International Law

that requires theoretical justification,l1 but also, without legitimacy, international
courts simply could not function as a practical matter. They lack enforcement
powers and a guaranteed flow of funds. They rely on the political will of the
international community to avoid irrelevance. Sociological research shows that
people are more likely to defer to decisions and rules when they view deciding
authorities as legitimate. 12 Similarly, states may withdraw from the jurisdiction of
international courts or impede their functioning when they no longer perceive
them as legitimate. 13 In the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms and
guaranteed funding, perceptions that courts possess legitimacy increase the odds
that states and others will cooperate with them and respect their rulings. 14
International courts are playing a greater role in international dispute resolution
and the development of international law than ever before. 15 If sex
representation affects legitimacy, it must become a higher priority for
international court supporters. Although various studies note the paucity of
women judges on international courts,16 few question its impact on the

11

See generally Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation if
International Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 Eur J Inti L (2012)
(forthcoming), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=1593543 (visited Sept 18, 2011). See also M.
Koskenniemi, The Ideology ifInternationalAt!Judication and the 1907 Hague Conftrence, in Yves Daudet,
ed, Topicality if the 1907 Hague Conftrence, the Second Peace Conference 127, 152 (Martinus Nijhoff 2008)
("[I]t is high time that 'international adjudication' were made the object of critical analysis instead
of religious faith.").

12

Tom R. Tyler, et al, Legitimary and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives, in Tom R. Tyler, ed,
Legitimacy and International Criminal Justice: International Perspectives 9, 10 (Russell Sage 2007).

13

For example, the United States famously withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ
following its decision in the Nicaragua case. See United States Department of State, Department
Statement, Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated f?y Nicaragua in the International
Court ifJustice Oan 18, 1985), 24 ILM 246 (1985); United States Department of State, Department if
State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination if Acceptance if 1. c.]. Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct 7,
1985), 24 ILM 1742 (1985) (terminating the United States' acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ).

14

Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 26 (Oxford 1995) ("International law,
even more than any individual state's legal system, needs this element of promotion of voluntary
compliance because of the relative paucity of modes of compulsion.").

15

See, for example, Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
International At!Judication: Elementsfora Theory if Consent, 39 NYU J Inti L & Pol 791, 797-98 & n 18
(2007). See generally Andrea K. Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: WIzy International
Dispute Resolution Is Increasingjy Judiciali~d, 2006 J Disp Resol 119 (2006) (discussing the increasing
judicialization of international public disputes).

16

See, for example, Jan Linehan, Women and Public International Litigation (project on International
Courts and Tribunals 2002), online at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/PICT_articles/
Women1.pdf (visited Oct 11, 2011) (surveying a number of international courts); Ruth Mackenzie
and Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence if the International Judge, 44
Harv Inti L J 271, 278 (2003) ("Another nomination and selection issue worthy of attention is the
relatively low number of female judges on international courts and tribunals.").
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legitimacy of international adjudication.17 The time has come to determine
whether women judges actually matter to the legitimacy of international courts.
A court is legitimate when it possesses justified authority. IS It has qualities
that lead "people (or states) to accept [its] authority ... because of a general
sense that the authority is justified."19 In previous work, I proposed that
international courts are perceived as legitimate when they (1) are fair and
unbiased, (2) interpret and apply norms consistent with what states believe the
law is or should be, and (3) are transparent and infused with democratic norms. 20
While a normatively legitimate institution "has the right to rule," based on
presumably objective criteria, a sociologically legitimate institution is "believed to
have the right to rule," a subjective determination. 21 Those concerned with
normative legitimacy ask whether an institution is actually legitimate and what
ought to matter to perceptions of justified authority, drawing from philosophy
or political theory.22 Students of sociological legitimacy ask what drives relevant
constituencies-individuals, non-governmental organizations, international
organizations, states, and the international community-to view international
courts as possessing justified authority.23 The underpinnings of sociological
legitimacy are presumably provable through empirical research. 24

17

See, for example, Noemi Gal-Or, The Under-Representation of Women and Women's Perspectives in
International Dispute Resolution Processes, 4 Transnatl Disp Mgmt *7 (2008) (beginning to formulate
hypotheses on why the absence of women matters to international dispute resolution); Sally J.
Kenney, Breaking the Silence: Gender Mainstreaming and the Composition of the European Court ofJustice, 10
Feminist Legal Studies 257, 265-66 (2002) (considering whether the paucity of women on the
European Court of Justice's (ECJ) bench affects its legitimacy and why).

18

Nienke Grossman, Legitimary and InternationalA4Judicative Bodies, 41 Geo Wash Inti L Rev 107,115
(2009); Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimary of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?, 93 Am J Inti L 596, 600-01 (1999); Klaus Dingwerth, The New
Transnationalism: Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimary 14-15 (palgrave MacMillan 2007).

19

Bodansky, 93 Am] Inti L at 600 (cited in note 18).

20

See generally Grossman, 41 Geo Wash Inti L Rev 107 (cited in note 18); David Luban, Fairness to
Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimary of International Criminal Law, Working Paper No
1154117, *13 (Georgetown University Law Center, 2008), online at http:/ / papers.ssrn.com/
so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1154177 (visited Oct 11, 2011); Tom R. Tyler, Legitimary and
Criminal Justice at 4 (cited in note 12).

21

Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimary of Global Governance Institutions, in Rudiger
Wolfrum and Volker Raben, eds, Legitimary in International Law 25, 25-26, 31 (Springer 2008), as
discussed in Nienke Grossman, Sex Representation on the Bench and the Legitimary of International
Criminal Courts, 11 Inti Crim L Rev 643, 645 (2011). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimary and
the Constitution, 118 Harv L Rev 1787, 1795 (2005).

22

Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimary in International Law, in Rudiger Wolfrum and Volker
Raben, eds, Legitimary in International Law 308,309-310,313 (Springer 2008).

23

Id.

24

See id.
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After providing the statistics on women's participation on eleven different
international courts in Section II, this Article argues that sex representation
influences both normative and sociological legitimacy of international courts.
Section III asserts that when men and women decide issues differently because
of gender 25-or qualities unique to each sex derived from nature or nurtureboth sexes are necessary for unbiased adjudication, an important legitimacyinfluencing factor. Courts where one sex is severely under- or over-represented
lack normative legitimacy because they are inherently biased. Section IV explains
that even if men and women do not "think differently," sex representation
matters for sociological legitimacy because relevant constituencies believe they
do nonetheless. Constituencies who believe sex affects outcomes will view
unrepresentative courts as lacking justified authority. Section IV relies on the
history of the creation of the post-World War II international criminal tribunals
and discusses the attitudes of traditionally excluded and discriminated groups
toward unrepresentative courts. Section V proposes that sex representation
strengthens the normative legitimacy of international courts because
representativeness is an important democratic value. It discusses new
representativeness requirements on a variety of international courts and
tribunals. Section VI concludes the Article and raises questions for further study
and debate.

II. WOMEN ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE NUMBERS 26
The paucity of women sitting on the benches of many of the world's most
important international adjudicative bodies is striking. Table I provides the basic
statistics, including the total number and percentages of women judges on
eleven different international courts and tribunals in late May and early June
2010. The statistics for the IC] are more recent, however. 27 Figure A shows the
percentage of permanent women judges since these bodies were established,
while Figure B shows the percentage of women judges, both ad hoc or ad litem
and permanent, serving on these courts in late May and early June 2010.
These bodies are "international" because they were established by
multilateral treaties or by the international community through the United
Nations Security Council; the adjudicators and staff include citizens of many

25

Charlesworth and Chinkin define "gender" as capturing "the ascribed, social nature of distinctions
between women and men-the excess cultural baggage associated with biological sex." Hilary
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist AnalYsis 3
(Manchester 2000).

26

Unless otherwise cited, see Table I and accompanying endnotes for the sources of statistics in this
Section. The endnotes also explain how these statistics were compiled.

27

The ICJ statistics are from February 2011.
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states; and they interpret and apply international law. They are adjudicative
bodies because they interpret and may apply law to specific factual scenarios.
This Article focuses on courts of recognized international importance, dealing
primarily, but not exclusively, with issues of public international law.
The international courts and tribunals surveyed include courts of both
general and specific jurisdiction. They address issues as wide-ranging as trade,
human rights, maritime delimitation, foreign investment, and genocide. While
some of these courts are permanent, like the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR), the International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), others are
expected to be of temporary duration, such as the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). Further,
they include arbitral tribunals, such as those convened under the auspices of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the
World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body (WTO DSB).
No women judges sat on the ITLOS bench in May 2010, and women
judges were virtually absent until only recently from the ICJ .28 After the ICJ and
ITLOS, the ECJ contained the next lowest number of women judges, with 15
percent permanent female judges in May 2010. Four of the six women judges
ever to have served on the ECJ sat on the bench in June 2010. 29
Women made up 43 percent of the WTO Appellate Body at the time of
the study. Since its establishment, however, only 19 percent of Appellate Body
members were women. Three of the four women who served on the Appellate
Body since it was created sat on the bench in mid-2010. Women were appointed
only 17 percent of the time to WTO arbitral panels in 2009. Women were
appointed only 9 percent of the time to ICSID panels in 2009. Historically,
women made up a mere 6 percent of individuals appointed to arbitrate disputes
in ICSID.
28

On June 29, 2010, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council elected Xue
Hanqin, the second woman ever to serve as a permanent judge on the IC). Chi/lese Diplomat Elected
to International Court of Justice (Xinhua General News Service June 29, 2010) online at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/29 / c 13376020.htm (visited Oct 12,
2011). On September 9, 2010, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council elected
Joan E. Donoghue to become the third woman judge on the IC]. ICJ, Two New Members (cited in
note 1). As this article went to press, on December 15, 2011, the United Nations General
Assembly and Security Council elected Ms. Julia Sebutinde to serve as a member of the ICJ
effective February 2012. ICJ, United Nations General Assembly and Security Council elect Ms Julia
Sebutinde as a Member of the Court (cited in note 3).

29

Nienke Grossman, Sex Representation on the Bench and the Legitimary of International Criminal Courts *7,
online at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1723407 (visited Nov 18, 2011).
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The human rights courts-the Inter-American, African, and European
Courts-ranged from 18 to 37 percent permanent female judges on the bench.
All three human rights courts showed increases in the percentage of permanent
women judges since establishment. Two of the four women ever to have served
on the IACHR were judges in June 2010. Only one woman has ever served as an
ad hoc judge on the IACHR, in 2009.
The ICC was the only court to exceed 50 percent participation by women.
Fifty-eight percent of judges on the ICC in May 2010 were women.
Nevertheless, as of July 22, 2011, no female candidates were nominated to fill six
spots opening on the bench. 30 Although only one permanent woman judge sat
on the sixteen-member bench of the ICTY in May 2010,42 percent of ad litem
judges were women, and 21 percent of all judges in May 2010 were women.
Historically, women made up 15 percent and 29 percent of permanent and ad
litem judges on the ICTY. Twenty percent of ICTR permanent judges were
women, while 27 percent of ad litem judges were women in mid-2010. Since the
ICTR's establishment, women constituted 36 percent of ad litem judges and 18
percent of all permanent judges.
In sum, men were over-represented when compared to their proportion of
the population on the eleven adjudicatory bodies surveyed in May and June
2010. Women made up only about 21 percent of the judiciary of these
international courts. The percentages ranged from a percent on ITLOS to an
exceptional 58 percent on the ICC bench. Courts whose subject matter
jurisdiction is limited to human rights and international criminal law possessed
the highest percentage of women judges, when both permanent judges and ad
hoc or ad litem judges are included. The only exception is the WTO, when both
the Appellate Body and panels are counted. 31 The courts with the lowest
percentage of women ad hoc or ad litem plus permanent judges were ITLOS (0
percent), the IC] (5 percent), and ICSID (9 percent).

III. SEX REPRESENTATION MATTERS TO NORMATIVE
LEGITIMACY WHEN MEN AND WOMEN "THINK
DIFFERENTL y"

The perception that adjudicators are impartial or unbiased is essential to
any court's legitimacy, including international ones. Bias, or partiality, is "an
inclination of temperament or outlook; especiallY: a personal and sometimes

30

ICC, Alphabetical Us! (cited in note to). By October 2011, two women candidates had also been
nominated. Id.

31

The statutes of human rights and international criminal courts are also more likely
requirements for sex representation on the bench. See Section IV.A.
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unreasoned judgment: prejudice."32 Bias undermines fairness, which is closely
tied to justified authority.33 There can be no fair trial before a biased bench. Like
domestic courts, international court decisions must be fair, consistent, and
driven by law to retain legitimacy.34 The international community's belief in the
importance of impartial judges is apparent in ubiquitous provisions requiring the
35
selection of impartial judges in the statutes of international courts. Judges are
expected to constrain their reasoning within the bounds of law to avoid
accusations of partiality and bias. States or other constituencies may withdraw

32

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 118 (Merriam-Webster 11 ed 2003) (defIning bias). The Oxford
Dictionary defInes bias as "prejudice in favor of or against one thing, person, or group compared
with another, usually in a way considered to be unfair ...." Elizabeth J. Jewell and Frank Abate,
eds, New Oxford American Dictionary 160 (Oxford 2001).

33

See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality 17-18 (Oxford 1995). See also Luban, Fairness to Rightness at
*13 (cited in note 20); Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice at 4 (cited in note 12); Grossman, 41
Geo Wash Ind L Rev at 129 (cited in note 18).

34

See Luban, Faimess to Rightness at **13-14 (cited in note 20); Steven Glickman, Note, Victims'
Justice: Legitimii/ng the Sentencing Regime of the Intemational Criminal Court, 43 Colum J Transnad L 229,
266 (2004). See generally Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano, and Leigh Swigart, The Intemational
Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World's Cases 102-04, 147-49 (Brandeis
2007). See also Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 147-48 (Oxford 1990)
(referring to the idea of consistent application of rules as "coherence," a quality that will affect the
"compliance pull" of rules). "[It] legitimates a rule, principle, or implementing institution because
it provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to 1) its own
principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to solve similar problems, and 3) a lattice of
principles in use to resolve different problems." Id.

35

See, for example, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 36(3)(a), 37 ILM
999, 1020 (1998) (Rome Statute) ("The judges shall be chosen from among persons of high moral
character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifIcations required in their respective
States for appointment to the highest judicial offIces."); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Art 13, 32 ILM 1159, 1195 (1993) (ICTY Statute) ("The
judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial
offIces."); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art 12,33 ILM 1598, 1606
(1994) (ICTR Statute) ("The judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality, and
integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to
the highest judicial offIces."); Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 2, 59 Stat 1055,
1055 (1945) (IC] Statute) ("The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges,
elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess
the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial
offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law."). See also Grossman,
41 Geo Wash Ind L Rev at 132-33, 136-37 (cited in note 18) (quoting provisions from the ECJ,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), IC], ITLOS, Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA), and the World Trade Organization (WTO»).
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from a court's jurisdiction or cease to comply with its judgments if they perceive
bias on the bench. 36
Sex representation matters to legitimacy when the sexes approach
differently law, facts, or any part of the task of judicial decisionmaking, or when
they influence each other's decisions because of differences derived from
biology or distinct life experiences, also called "gender.,,37 If women and men
bring varying viewpoints to bear on judging, and neither sex's approach is
inherently "correct," both are necessary for unbiased process and results. 38
Low numbers of women judges on international courts make empirical
studies of the impact of women judges on international adjudication quite rare. 39
One recent study shows that women judges are much more likely to rule in favor
of jurisdiction in ICSID cases than men. 40 In fact, women never voted against
jurisdiction. 41 Although limited, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests a
gender effect in international criminal cases. For example, one study showed that
IC1Y panels with female judges imposed more severe sanctions on defendants
who assaulted women, while male judges imposed more severe sanctions on
defendants who assaulted men. 42 Further, Judge Navanethem Pillay, the only
female judge on the ICTR panel tryingJean Paul Akayesu, is credited with taking
the initiative to question witnesses about evidence of sexual violence. 43 Her

36

See, for example, Edith B. Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in Lori
F. Damrosch, ed, The International Court ofjustice at a Crossroads 123, 123-24 (Transnational 1987);
Tyler, Legitimary and Criminal justice at 10 (cited in note 12).

37

Charlesworth and Chinkin, Boundaries of International Law at 3 (cited in note 25).

38

See Kate Malleson, justi.f;ing Gender Equality on the Bench: W0 Difference Won't Do, 11 Feminist Legal
Studies, 1, 10-11 (2003) (making a similar argument for justifying gender equality on the bench).

39

For example, a study examining the relationship between sentence length and sex of judge and
victim did not include the ICTR because "there are too few [women judges] to conduct empirical
analysis and virtually all the guilty defendants received life sentences." Kimi L. King and Megan
Greening, Gender justice or just Gender? The Role of Gender in Sexual Assault Decisions at the International
Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 88 Soc Sci Q 1049, 1050 n 2 (2007).

40

Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, ASIL Research Forum *35 (UCLA Nov
5, 2011), online at hrtp://www.asil.org/midyearmeeting/pdfs/papers/November_5_2pm/
Are%20Arbitrators%20Political.pdf (visited Nov 18, 2011).

41

Id.

42

King and Greening, 88 Soc Sci Q at 1049-50 (cited in note 39). See also id at 1065-66 ("Having
a female judge on cases with female victims increases the sentences by about 46 months ....
Female judges seem to be protecting female victims in sexual assault cases .... All male panels
give lengthier sentences by 106 months if there is a male victim than those including female
jurists .... ").

43

Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 Case W Res J Inti L 277, 282 (2002). See
also Navanethem Pillay, Equal justice for Women: A Personal Joumf!Y, 50 Ariz L Rev 657, 665-66
(2008); Terris, Romano, and Swigart, The International Judge at 44-45 (cited in note 34); Beth Van
Schaack, Engendering Genocide: The Akayesu Case Before the IerR, in Deena R. Hurwitz and Margaret
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insistence, combined with the efforts of non-governmental organizations,
resulted in amendment of Akayesu's indictment to include charges of sexual
violence. 44 The Tribunal then convicted him of the crimes against humanity of
rape and of genocide founded on rape. Mr. Akayesu was the first person ever
convicted of such crimes. 45 In the words of the former prosecutor of both the
Rwandan and Yugoslav Tribunals, Richard Goldstone:
This judicial diligence in facilitating testimony on gender crimes and in
urging the inclusion of such crimes in indictments, together with the
diligence of Patricia Sellers and others in the Office of the Prosecutor,
contributed to the significant progress that the Tribunals have made in their
recognition and prosecution of gender crimes. 46

Similarly, even when ICTY lawyers thought insufficient evidence was available
to charge Dragan Nikolic with gender crimes, ICTY Judge Elizabeth Odio
Benito "publicly exhorted" prosecutors to include gender crimes in his
indictment. 47 Nikolic ultimately pled guilty to a number of charges, including
aiding and abetting the crime against humanity of rape. 48
Unlike international courts, a plethora of scholars have studied judicial
gender effects in United States courts. These studies, however, show a limited
and sometimes non-existent gender effect on judging, with the possible
exception of cases involving gender issues like family law and discrimination. 49
Yet a recent survey of United States federal appellate opinions showed a sex
discrimination plaintiff was 10 percentage points less likely to prevail if the judge
was male. 50 When a woman was present on a judicial panel deciding a sex
discrimination case, men were more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff. 51 The
L. Satterthwaite, eds, Human Rights Advocacy Stories 193, 200-01 (Foundation 2009) (showing that

male judges were also solicitous of testimony on crimes of sexual violence in the Akqyesu case).
44

Goldstone, 34 Case W Res J Inti L at 282 (cited in note 43).

45

See Prosecutor v Akqyesu, Judgment, Case No ICTR-96-4, '11'11696,731 (lCTR Sept 2, 1998); Jose E.
Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment,S ILSA J Inti & Camp L 359, 362-63 (1999).

46

Goldstone, 34 Case W Res J Inti L at 282 (cited in note 43).

47

Id at 281. See also Terris, Romano, and Swigart, Thelntemational Judge at 44 (cited in note 34).

48

Prosecutor v Nikolii, Sentencing Judgment, Case No IT-94-2-S, '\1'\115, 21-22 (ICTY Dec 18,2003).

49

Sally J. Kenney, Thinking about Gender and Judging, 15 Inti J Legal Prof 87, 96-101 (2008); Malleson,
11 Feminist Legal Studies at 5--8 (cited in note 38). Sally Kenney and Kate Malleson provide a
summary of many of these studies and their varied results. See Kenney, 15 Inti J Legal Prof at 96101; Malleson 11 Feminist Legal Studies at 7 (cited in note 38). Especially since United States
President Jimmy Carter made concerted efforts to diversify the United States federal bench, many
scholars have studied the impact of gender (and race) on judging in the United States. See, for
example, Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 Mich J Gender & L
113,117-20 (1999).

50

Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, and Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects
Judging, 54 Am J Pol Sci 389, 390 (2010).
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Id at 390, 406.
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study found "the presence of a female on the panel actually causes male judges to
vote in a way they otherwise would not-in favor of plaintiffs."52 Another study
showed asylum applicants randomly assigned to female judges were 44 percent
more likely to prevail than those assigned to male judges. 53
Given the paucity of data on a gender effect in international court judging,
statements of women judges are instructive. Both international and domestic
female judges assert that their gender affects judging, at least in some areas of
the law. For example, former United States Appellate Court and ICTY Judge
Patricia Wald wrote:
Do women on the bench really make any difference in the development of
the law? The maxim that a wise man and a wise woman will come to the
same conclusions is endlessly repeated, but I think it is somewhat simplistic.
And certainly different wise women will come to different conclusions.
Nearer the truth, I think, is that being a woman and being treated by society
as a woman can be a vital element of a judge's experience. That experience
in turn can subtly affect the lens through which she views issues and
solutions .... A judge is the sum of her experiences and if she has suffered
disadvantages or discrimination as a woman, she is apt to be sensitive to its
subtle expressions or to paternalism. 54
Judge Wald has pointed to five major gender-crime precedents crafted when at
least one female judge sat on the bench. 55 While ICC Judge Navanethem Pillay
posited women do not "decide in a different way," she also proposed that
"women come with a particular sensitivity and understanding about what
happens to people who are raped.,,56 Similarly, a former judge of the IACHR,
Cecilia Medina Quiroga, described a situation where her womanly perspective
affected reparations in a case involving a massacre where rape occurred in
Guatemala. 57
National judges echo these sentiments. Although she expressed doubts
about the accuracy of studies purporting to show that gender affects judging,
United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested gender
may playa role in shaping the law nonetheless: "[I]he presence of women on
the bench made it possible for the courts to appreciate earlier than they might
52

Id at 406.

53

Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, Refugee RtJUlette: Disparities in
Asylum Acfjudication, 60 Stan L Rev 295,342 (2007).

54

Patricia M. Wald, Six Not-50-Easy Pieces: One Woman Judge's Journey to the Bench and Beyond, 36 U
Toledo L Rev 979, 989 (2005).

55

Patricia M. Wald, What Do Women Want From International Criminal Justice? To Help Shape the Law
(lntLawGrrls Oct 5, 2009), online at http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2009/10/what-do-womenwant-from-international.html (visited Oct 12, 2011).

56

Terris, Romano, and Swigart, The International Judge at 48 (cited in note 34).

57

Id at 186-87.
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otherwise that sexual harassment belongs under Title VII.,,58 In Scifford Unified
School District v Redding, a case involving the constitutionality of the strip search of
a 13-year old girl, Justice Ginsburg asserted of her all-male colleagues: "'They
have never been a 13-year-old girl.' ... 'It's a very sensitive age for a girl.' ... 'I
didn't think that my colleagues, some of them, quite understood.",59
Similarly, Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, the first woman on Canada's
highest court, wrote that "there are probably whole areas of the law on which
there is no uniquely feminine perspective," but:
In some other areas of the law, [ ] a distinctly male perspective is clearly
discernible. . . . Some aspects of the criminal law in particular cry out for
change; they are based on presuppositions about the nature of women and
women's sexuality that, in this day and age, are little short of ludicrous."6o

Likewise, Lady Baroness Hale, the sole female justice on the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom, asserted that her "leading a woman's life" made a
difference in her judging in "some areas '" the most obvious being childbearing and sexuality.,,61 In her view, women bring "different perceptions to the
task of fact-finding-which is what most judges do much of the time.,,62
A European Commission survey of both male and female judges,
advocates, and public prosecutors in fifteen European Union states found that
in cases involving violence against women or children, family issues, and to a
lesser extent, sexual discrimination, "it is recognised (mainly by the women
interviewed) that gender does have an influence.,,63 Several women judges from
Northern Ireland made similar statements. 64 One proposed that differences in
experience by gender would increase sentencing in cases involving child abuse
and sex crimes. 65 Another remarked, "[i]t would bring in a different dimension I
think. You don't apply the law any differently. But I do think you see things
from a different angle.,,66 In the same vein, Israeli District Court Judge Hana
58

Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, NY Times MM22 Ouly 12, 2009) (interviewing
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).

59

Neil A. Lewis, Debate on Whether Female Judges Decide Different!J Arises Anew, NY Times A16 Oune 4,
2009).

60

Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Real!J Make a Difference? 28 Osgoode Hall L J 507, 515 (1990).

61

Brenda Hale and Rosemary Hunter, A Conversation with Baroness Hale, 16 Feminist Legal Studies
237,245 (2008).

62

Id.

63

See Miriam Anasagasti and Nathalie Wuiame, Women and Decision-Making in the Judiciary in the
European Union 8 (European Commission 1999). See also id at 23-24.

64

Dermot Feenan, Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifjing Diversity, 25 J L & Socy 490, 510-12
(2008).

65

Id at 512.

66

Id at 510.
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Evenor perceived litde difference between male and female judges most of the
time. 67 Yet she pointed out several instances where gender likely makes a
difference, including commercial cases "where women may be a bit more
suspicious regarding certain transactions," a case involving the requirement for
corroborating testimony in sexual assault cases, and a case involving a heinous
sexual assault where she had to convince her male colleagues that a woman did
not consent to rape. 68
While many women judges on international and domestic courts reject the
idea that gender makes a difference in every case, they consistendy point to
situations where it has. Being women affected the way they viewed certain facts,
and sometimes, entire substantive areas of the law. In the domestic realm, judges
and scholars reference discrimination, family, domestic violence, asylum,
criminal, and commercial law cases as, at least occasionally, influenced by judicial
gender. Because of the paucity of female judges on international courts,
especially until fairly recendy, few empirical studies of gender effects are
available. Nonetheless, women did vote differendy than men on jurisdiction in
ICSID cases. Also, where female judges are more common-on human rights
and international criminal courts-one empirical study and anecdotal evidence
suggest a gender effect. Although feminists offer critiques of several fields and
doctrines of international law, such as environmental and economic law and
state sovereignty and responsibility,69 whether sex representation actually affects
adjudication largely remains to be seen. If, or perhaps when, gender affects
judging, impartiality requires both male and female judges. Because impartiality
is a fundamental driver of legitimacy, severe over- or under-representation of
one sex detracts from a court's normative legitimacy.

IV. SEX REPRESENTATION MATTERS TO SOCIOLOGICAL
LEGITIMACY BECAUSE PEOPLE BELIEVE MEN AND WOMEN
"THINK DIFFERENTLY"

What if these judges and limited empirical studies are wrong? Maybe
women of diverse religions, cultures, nationalities, classes, and sexualities lack
some fundamental "essence" that transcends their differences. 7o In other words,
67

Hana Evenor, Women on the Bench, in Shimon Shetreet, ed, Women in Law 93, 95 (Kluwer 1998).

68

Id at 95-96.

69

See generally Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji, eds, International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches
(Hart 2005) (discussing feminist critiques of various areas and doctrines of international law). See
also generally Karen Knop, Rei statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3
Transnad L & Contemp Probs 293 (1993).

70

D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction, in D. Kelly Weisberg, ed, Feminist ugal Theory: Foundations 335
(Temple 1993) (defining essentialism).
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perhaps no uniquely "female" perspective exists at all, or at least not in all areas
of international law. And can't judges educate themselves about their partiality
when it does exist, as Dean Martha Minow has suggested? 71
Sex representation matters nonetheless. So long as constituencies of these
courts believe gender shapes or informs how judges view law or facts, sex
representation matters to perceptions of impartiality and fairness, and thereby,
sociological legitimacy. The history of the creation of the post-World War II
international criminal tribunals suggests non-governmental organizations and
states argued for the inclusion of women judges because they thought women
would make a difference to outcomes and decisionmaking-regardless of
whether they actually do. Further, representation appears to be of particular
importance in shaping perceptions of impartiality and fairness where one group
has experienced a history of discrimination or unfair treatment, regardless of the
subject matter jurisdiction of any specific adjudicatory body. In such cases,
constituencies are likely to question the authority of a court that lacks
representation of the discriminated group.

A. The International Criminal Tribunals
Groups influential in the shaping of post-World War II international
criminal tribunals appeared to believe sex representation affected both the
direction of the law and complete fact-finding. During the creation of the ICTY,
several non-governmental organizations mobilized for the inclusion of women
judges among numerous other initiatives aimed at ensuring perpetrators of rape
would be punished. 72 Women's groups feared the rape of tens of thousands of
mostly Bosnian Muslim women would be ignored. 73 Despite horrendous tales of
rape and other sex-based violence against women in World War II, Nuremberg
prosecutors chose not to prosecute or introduce evidence about these crimes. 74
Although the International Military Tribunal for the Far East heard some
testimony about rape, especially committed by the Japanese troops in Nanking
and the Philippines, gender-specific crimes were not widely prosecuted. 7s
Women's groups thought that the presence of women judges might make a

71
72

Martha Minow,Justice Engendered, 101 Harv L Rev 10, 74 (1987).
Jennifer Green, et aI, Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique,S Hastings
Women's LJ 171, 176 (1994).

73

See, for example, id (discussing pressure by women's groups to make sure that gender-based
crime be punished).

74

Kelly D. Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals 13-14
(Martinus Nijhoff 1997).

75

Id at 180,194,202-03 n 648.
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difference in the prosecution of international crimes against women. 76 For these
reasons, women's groups lobbied hard for the election of Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald and Elizabeth Odio Benito to the ICTY bench. 77
The National Alliance of Women's Organisations, a British umbrella group
concerned with women's human rights and equality, saw the establishment of
the ICTY as an opportunity not only to "assure full justice to women in the
former Yugoslavia who have been and continue to be brutalized in sex-specific
ways, but also to correct the historic trivialization of the abuse of women in
war.,,78 Among its proposals for achieving these goals were "[t]hat at least 50%
of the personnel involved at every level and in every aspect of the Tribunal's
functions be women.,,79 The Organization of the Islamic Conference's proposal
on the composition of the new Tribunal, too, called for the judges to "represent,
on an equitable geographic basis, the world's major legal systems, with particular
representation from the Islamic countries and with due regard to gender
representation.,,80
Similarly, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights proposed that criteria
for the selection of judges be "designed to ensure diversity in terms of
geographic origin, gender and religion.,,81 The United Nations Secretary
General's Report on the creation of a Yugoslav tribunal promoted the hiring of
women staff, and the United States representative to the Security Council
emphasized the importance of women jurists and prosecutors at the ICTY. 82
76

See Green, et al, 5 Hastings Women's LJ at 176 (cited in note 72).

77

Id at 176--77.

78

Letter of the National Alliance of Women's Organizations to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, The United Nations Commission of Experts, the Members of the Security Council and
The United Nations Office of Legal Counsel (Mar 31, 1993), in Virginia Morris and Michael P.
Scharf, 2 An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia: A
Documentary History and Analysis 399 (Transnational 1995).

79

Id at 401.

80

Letter from the Representatives of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, and Turkey to the Secretary General of the United Nations (Mar 31, 1993), in
Morris and Scharf, 2 Insider's Guide 405,407 (cited in note 78) (emphasis added).

81

Letter from the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights to United Nations Secretary General (Apr
19,1993), in Morris and Scharf, 2 Insider's Guide 463,465 (cited in note 78).
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UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to '\I 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), UN Doc S/25704, '\I 88 (May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1159 (1993) ("Given the
nature of the crimes committed and the sensitivities of victims of rape and sexual assault, due
consideration should be given in the appointment of staff to the employment of qualified
women."). Madeleine Albright asserted that "[mly Government is also determined to see that
women jurists sit on the Tribunal and that women prosecutors bring war criminals to justice. Our
view is shared by all of the women Permanent Representatives of this Organization." Provisional
Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting (May 25,
1993), in Morris and Scharf, 2 Insider's Guide 179, 186 (cited in note 78).
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Nonetheless, when the United Nations Security Council created the Yugoslav,
and later, Rwandan tribunals, it included no requirements for sex representation
in their statutes. 83 Only after the creation of the ICC did the Security Council
add a sex-representation provision to the statutes, and then only for ad litem
.JUdges. 84
When the time came to negotiate the constitutive instrument of the ICC,
non-governmental organizations and many countries insisted on the inclusion of
a provision requiring "a fair representation of female and male judges," as well
as expertise in violence against women and children. 85 Both non-governmental
organizations and states justified the inclusion of this language in part based on
perceptions of women judges' impact on the law and facts developed by the
ICTY and the ICTR. 86 For example, the United States supported the
appointment of "qualified women as well as men" because "[o]n the basis of its
experience [with the ICTY and the ICTR] ... [it] believed that that issue needed
to be covered explicitly in the Statute if the Court was to be responsive to the
concerns of women caught up in international and internal conflicts.,,87 The
representative from Senegal, too, called for gender balance: "The [ICTR and
ICTY] ... had been hampered by the lack of judges with experience in regard to
violence against women, rape or discrimination against women. A woman who
[had] been raped would naturally find it easier to talk about her experience to
another woman.,,88
Similarly, the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice, an international
women's human rights organization based in New York at the time of the Rome
Statute negotiations, argued that "[f]or the International Criminal Court to
effectively dispense and promote universal justice '" it must necessarily
incorporate gender perspectives in all aspects of its jurisdiction, structure and
operations.,,89 Among its imperatives for achieving this goal was gender balance

83

ICTY Statute, Art 12; ICTR Statute, Art 12.

84

See Section V.

85

Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International
Criminal Law, 46 McGill L J 217,238 (2000), citing Rome Statute, Arts 36(8)(a)(iii), 36(8)(b).

86

Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in Roy S. Lee, ed, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results 357,359 (Hague 1999).

87

Consideration of the Question Concerning the Finalization and Adoption of a Convention on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court in Accordance with General Assembfy Resolutions 51/207 oj 17 December
1996 and 52/ 160 of 15 December 1997, 14th Meeting aune 24, 1998), in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed, 3
The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Summary Records of the 1998 Diplomatic
Conference 208 (transnational 2005).
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Idat215.
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NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Core Principles oj the Women's Caucus, 8 Inti
Crim Ct Monitor 13, 13 aune 1998). Further, the Women's Caucus wrote that to promote and
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in the composition and staffing of all organs of the ICC. 90 Overall, discussions
during the drafting of the Rome Statute about gender balance and expertise on
sexual violence revealed that ignoring these issues might harm "perceptions of
States, their overall attitude towards the Court, and in the long run, the Court's
efficacy and credibility.,,91
At least for some constituencies involved in the shaping of the post-World
War II international criminal tribunals, sex representation was a prerequisite to
impartial adjudication. Without both male and female perspectives, these
tribunals lacked justified authority, even with no guarantee that the women
appointed would in fact be more responsive to these constituencies' concerns.
B. Traditionally Discriminated or Excluded Groups and
Perceptions of Bias
Representation appears especially important to perceptions of impartiality,
and thereby legitimacy, when a group has suffered discrimination in the
adjudicative system, regardless of the subject matter jurisdiction of any particular
court. How judges behaved historically toward an under-represented group,
both in courtrooms and in their decisions, makes constituencies question judges'
and benches' impartiality. Continued exclusion from the bench, as well as from
traditional lawmaking bodies, perpetuates perceptions of unfairness and
partiality in adjudication. On the other hand, inclusion of previously excluded
groups can change perceptions of bias, as well as help to eliminate actual bias in
the judicial system.
The experience of South Africa is instructive. At the dawn of South
Africa's new democracy in 1994, 161 of the 166 superior court judges were
white males, and only 2 were women. 92 Given the history of institutionalized
discrimination against black South Africans, including by all-white courts, it is
not surprising that post-apartheid South Africans demanded a diverse judiciary.
Even if all white judges lost all prejudices the day after apartheid ended, how
could black South Africans trust an all-white judiciary to be impartial? One need
only review the transcript of the Nelson Mandela trial to imagine how most

dispense universal justice, "the Court must have the capacity to ensure that crimes against women
are not ignored or treated as trivial or secondary. It must take account of the disproportionate or
distinct impact of the core crimes on women. The Court should be equipped and enabled to
eliminate common assumptions about and prejudices against women and their experiences." Id.
90

Id.

91

Medard R. Rwelarnira, Composition and Administration
Criminal Court 153,167 (cited in note 86).
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Court, in Lee, ed, The International

Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Representation on the Courts in the Republic of South Africa, 6 U Md L J Race,
Relig, Gender & Class 291,298 (2006).
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black South Africans viewed the apartheid-era judicial system. Nelson Mandela
asked the white magistrate: "Why is it that in this courtroom I face a white
magistrate, am confronted by a white prosecutor, and escorted into the dock by
a white orderly? Can anyone honestly and seriously suggest that in this type of
atmosphere the scales of justice are evenly balanced?" 93 The magistrate
questioned the logic of Mandela's request for recusal: "After all is said and done,
there is only one court today and that is the White Man's court. There is no
other court.,,94 Groups who suffer discrimination by a judicial system are
unlikely to view it as legitimate during their continued exclusion. Similarly, an
American Bar Association study posited that "[w]ithin communities of color [in
the United States] ... concern that they receive unequal, inferior treatment in
the courts is compounded by a lack of confidence due to the lack of diversity
throughout the judiciary.,,95
The mere presence of excluded groups can counteract both actual bias and
perceptions of bias. 96 For example, United Kingdom Supreme Court Justice
Lady Baroness Hale asserted: "I think women may make a difference in other
ways too: for example by making it difficult for their male colleagues to voice
certain views that they might otherwise have been happy to voice.,,97 In the
United States, women judges were at the forefront of the movement to study
and remedy gender bias in the courtroom. In 1985, a group of women judges
created the National Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts to study and
formulate recommendations to eliminate gender bias in the United States court
system. 98 These taskforces showed rampant bias against women at all levels of
the judicial system, and they resulted in the creation of education programs
about gender fairness and discrimination for judges. 99
Groups traditionally discriminated against in the international context, too,
fear bias and seek to remedy it through representation of their perspectives. For
example, the drafters of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding chose to
93

Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life: His Speeches and Writings Brought Together with Historical
Documents and Accounts of Mandela in Prison by Fellow-Prisoners 135 (International Defence and Aid
Fund 1986).

94

Id at 134.
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2003), online at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2011).
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See, for example, Beiner, 6 MichJ Gender & L at 115-16 (cited in note 49).
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Hale and Hunter, 16 Feminist Legal Studies at 245 (cited in note 61).

98

See generally Lynn H. Schafran and Norma J. Wikler, Forward to Operating a Task Force on Gender
Bias in the Courts: A Manual for Action (Foundation for Women Judges 1986), online at
http://womenlaw.stanford.edu/pdf/ gender-bias. pdf (visited Oct 12, 2011).
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See id. See also Lynn H. Schafran, Promoting Gender Fairness through Judicial Education: A Guide to the
Issues and Resources iii r.:women Judges' Fund for Justice 1989).
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give developing states the right to demand adjudicators from developing
countries on dispute settlement panels, although only in disputes between
developed and developing states. 100 It is not surprising that developing countries
demanded developing-country judges, glVen Third World critiques of
international law and institutions. 101
Like most of the courts in Section II of this Article, the world's most
important international lawmaking bodies are usually sex un-representative. For
example, only two of thirty-four members of the International Law
Commission, the prestigious United Nations body charged with the "progressive
development" of international law, were women in September 2011. 102 Only two
women currently serve on the eleven-member Inter-American Juridical
Committee. 103 While the United Nations has made strides as a whole in
improving sex representativeness in its staff, women remain under-represented
at the senior level. 104 The chart below shows the number and percentage of
women on the United Nations human rights treaty bodies as of February 20,
2011. Women make up less than 40 percent of the membership on half of these
bodies. Only the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women have over 50 percent female
members.
For many feminist scholars, the exclusion of women from international
law-making processes creates a presumption of bias in all kinds of international
law, a presumption that requires sex representation to be rebutted. !Os Exclusion
or severe under-representation of women profoundly shapes the law by allowing

100

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art 8(10),
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal InsttumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125, 1232 (1994) ("When a dispute is between a
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"male concerns" to continue to be construed as "human concerns," while
shunting "women's issues" into a narrow, marginal category. 106

Treaty Body

Women/Total

Percent Women

Human Rights

5/18 107

27.8

Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women
Elimination of Racial
Discrimination

1/6 108

16.7

22/23 109

95.7

1/9 110

11.1

111

40.0

Against Torture

2/5

Rights of the Child

10/18112

55.6

Migrant Workers

2/7113

28.6

Rights of Persons with Disabilities

8/18" 4

44.4
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Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Membership, online at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/ cedaw / membership.htm (visited Feb 20, 2011).
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Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Members, online at http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/
cerd/members.htm (visited Feb 20, 2011).
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Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee against Torture,
Membership, online at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/members.htm (visited Feb 20,
2011).
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(visited Feb 20, 2011).
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So long as constituencies believe the sex of the judge affects judging, overrepresentation of one sex on the bench inherently harms perceptions of
impartiality and fairness, even if it makes no actual difference in case outcomes.
In creating post-World War II international criminal courts, both nongovernmental organizations and states pushed for the inclusion of women, in
part, because of beliefs that the presence of women would influence the
direction of the law or the development of facts. Further, when a group has
suffered a history of discrimination or exclusion, it is difficult to overcome a
presumption of bias without including the group on the bench, regardless of the
subject matter jurisdiction of a particular court.
V. SEX REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC VALUES, AND
LEGITIMACY

Imagine a world court with judges from only one country or one region of
the world. Even if its jurists were world-renowned scholars and diplomats, such
a court would lack legitimacy. Regardless of the soundness of its rulings, its
authority would be questioned. International courts' constitutive instruments
frequently require geographic diversity on the bench or representation by
national judges. 115 Legitimate adjudication requires both impartial and
independent judges as well as benches with some link to the states their rulings
affect. While Sections III and IV of this Article focus on the relationship
between sex representation, impartiality, and legitimacy, this Section examines
the relationship between representativeness qua representativeness and
legitimacy. Just as judges' geographical diversity matters to international courts'
legitimacy, this Section proposes that sex representation strengthens the
legitimacy of international courts by reflecting the population subject to their

114

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Elected Members of the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, online at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CRPD/Pages/Membership.aspx (visited Feb 20, 2011).

115

See, for example, ICJ Statute, Art 9 ("E]lectors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be
elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole
the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world
should be assured."); International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, Statute of the Tribunal, Art 2
(1982), 1833 UN Treaty Ser 561, 561 (1994) ("In the Tribunal as a whole the representation of the
principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution shall be assured.");
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008 OJ (Cl15) 27 ("The Court of
Justice shall consist of one judge from each Member State."); Statute of the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights, OAS Res 448 (lX-0/79) (lACHR Statute) ("No two judges may be nationals
of the same State."); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Art 20 (Nov 4, 1950), 213 UN Treaty Ser 221, § 4, Art 38 (1950) ("The European Court of
Human Rights shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the High Contracting
Parties.").
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authority, an important democratic value. Nonetheless, while representativeness
as a democratic value may be an important contributor to normative legitimacy,
it may harm perceptions of justified authority, or sociological legitimacy, for
some constituencies.
Traditionally, international law scholars evaluated the legitimacy of
international institutions by focusing on legal legitimacy alone: did states consent
to subject themselves to an institution's authority, and did the institution act
within the scope of that delegated authority?116 Whether authority derived from
the will of the people was a question reserved for assessments of individual
governments' legitimacy, not of international institutions' legitimacy.117 In the
wake of challenges to consent as the basis for the legitimacy of international
institutions,118 scholars are beginning to emphasize the relevance of democratic
values to international courts' legitimacy. These democratic values may include
transparency, accountability, participation, and representativeness. 119 The extent
to which international courts are infused with these values matters for legitimacy
because international courts wield public authority by shaping the law 120 and
because of the "powerful normative and social appeal of democracy as a
governing ideal.,,121 This Article seeks to enrich our understanding of
"representativeness" by arguing that it must include attention to the balance of
the sexes on the bench.
New requirements for the appointment of international court judges from
groups that transcend state boundaries suggest that the presence of various
groups-not just women-on the bench matters to the legitimacy of
international courts. These requirements are usually framed in terms of
"representation," a fundamental democratic value. For example, the constitutive

116

Bodansky, 93 Am J Inti L at 605 (cited in note 18) ("The authority of the International Court of
Justice, for example, derives from its Statute, to which UN member states consented. And the
Court's continuing authority depends on its acting in accordance with the Statute. If it went
outside or against the Statute, then its actions would lack legitimacy."). See also Jan Klabbers,
Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law 39 (Oxford 2009).

117

See, for example, Jean d'Aspremont and Eric De Brabandere, The Complementary Faces of Legitimary
in International Law: The Legitimary of Origin and the Legitimary of Exercise, 34 Fordham Int! L J 190,
197,201-02 (2011).

118

Grrunne De Burca, Developing Democrary Bryond the State, 46 Colum J Transnat! L 221, 226-27
(2008).

119

See, for example, Grossman, 41 Geo Wash Inti L Rev at 15:J.-60 (cited in note 18); von Bodgandy
and Venzke, In Whose Name? at **27, 36-37 (cited in note 11); Armin von Bogdandy and lngo
Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 Ger L J 1341, 1360
(2011). See also Michael Ioannidis, A Procedural Approach to the Legitimary oflntemational Atijudication:
Developing Standards of Participation in WTO Law} 12 Ger L J 1175, 1176 (2011).

120

Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name? at **2-3,16-18 (cited in note 11).

121

De Burca, 46 ColumJ Transnatl L at 226-27 (cited in note 118).
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instrument of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights states that
electors of judges should not only ensure that "there is representation of the
main regions of Africa and of their principal legal traditions," but also "that
there is adequate gender representation.,,122 The Rome Statute of the ICC
requires both individuals with legal expertise in violence against women and
children and "a fair representation of female and male judges" on the ICC
bench. 123 States' decision to include both of these groups suggests that an
international criminal court with no women judges would be unacceptable, even
if all the male judges were legal experts in violence against women and
children. 124 It is not just expertise (or assumptions about expertise based on sex)
that matters, but rather, actual representation of constituencies of the court.
Among those constituencies are victims of violations of international criminal
law. For example, in the Rome Statute negotiations, the Australian delegate
justified his support for gender balance and expertise on sexual violence because
"[w]omen and children were often the victims of the crimes which would fall
within its jurisdiction.,,125 The history of the debates over whether to include
these provisions shows that many states and non-state actors thought including
both sexes on the bench was not merely a "gesture in the direction of political
correctness,,,126 but rather, that it is important to the legitimacy of the
institution. 127
Similarly, Bosnia's ambassador to the United Nations, Mohamed Sacirbey,
lamented the absence of Muslims from the bench of the ICTY: "It is absurd that
most of the victims are Muslim, yet they have no representatives on the
Tribunal.,,128 Conrad Harper, United States State Department Legal Adviser, told
the press that the Clinton Administration was interested in nominating a woman
as ICTY judge '''because of the use of rape as an instrument of warfare in the

122

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art 14(2), (3), OAU Doc CAB/LEG/665 (1998).

123

Rome Statute, Arts 36(8)(a)-(b) (cited in note 35).

124

Interestingly, it appears that only the Afghani representative conflated the two. He argued in favor
of deleting the reference to gender balance, and instead, the language should be changed to state:
"The expert on issues related to sexual and gender violence and violence against children should
be a woman." Adoption of a Convention on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court at 215
(cited in note 87).

125

Id at 219.

126

John R.W.D. Jones, Composition of the Court, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.W.D.
Jones, eds, 1 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 235, 255 (Oxford
2002).

127

See generally, Grossman, 11 Inti Crim L Rev 643 (cited in note 21).

128

lain Guest, On Tnal: The United Nations, War Crimes and the Former Yugoslavia 131 (Refugee Policy
Group 1995).
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Bosnian conflict.",129 Because women were victims, they too should judge the
perpetrators. Judge Wald made a similar point with regard to the Rwanda
Tribunal: "In general, women had been woefully underrepresented on all
international tribunals.,,13o After the Rome Statute was signed, the Security
Council amended both the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes to add ad litem judges.
Echoing the language of the Rome Statute, both Security Council resolutions
required states nominating candidates for ad litem judge to take "into account
the importance of a fair representation of female and male candidates." 131
Although the constitutive instrument of the ECHR contains no sex
representation provision, in 2004 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe stated it would not consider unisex lists of candidates to the ECHR. 132
In 2005, the Committee of Ministers shared "the Assembly's determination to
secure a proper balance of the sexes in the composition of the Court" and
agreed that lists of candidates should contain candidates of each sex.133
The debate concerning the Parliamentary Assembly's new requirement and
Malta's failure to include female candidates on its lists for almost four years
suggests sex representation may play a role in assessments of the ECHR's
legitimacy. A Report from the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
of the Parliamentary Assembly argued that "it is in the interests of the

129

Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since
Nuremberg 66 (Carolina Academic 1997), citing Brenda Sapino, Gabrielle McDonald's Star Turn, Tex
Law 11 (Oct 2,1995).

130

Wald, 36 U Toledo L Rev at 991 (cited in note 54).

131

Security Council Res No 1329, UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000), Annex I, Art 13; Security Council
Res No 1431, UN Doc S/RES/1431 (2002), Annex I, Art 12. Neither statute was amended to
include female and male permanent judges.

132

It decided that "political groups, when nominating their representatives to the sub-committee [for
interviewing candidates] should aim to include at least 40% women, which is the parity threshold
deemed necessary by the Council of Europe to exclude gender bias in decision-making
processes." Candidates for European Court of Human Rights, Eur ParI Assembly Res No 1366
(2004). Also, "one of the criteria used by the sub-committee should be that, in the case of equal
merit, preference should be given to a candidate of the sex under-represented at the Court." Id. In
2005, the Parliamentary Assembly amended the requirement to state that it would not consider
lists of candidates where "the list does not include at least one candidate of each sex, except when
the candidates belong to the sex which is under-represented in the Court, that is the sex to which
under 40% of the total number of judges belong." Candidates for European Court of Human
Rights, Eur Pari Assembly Res No 1426 (2005).

133

Nonetheless, it chose not to seek to amend the Convention to require gender balance on the
ECHR, arguing that in exceptional circumstances, states should be permitted to derogate from
this general rule. Reply from the Committee of Ministers on Candidates for the European Court
of Human Rights, Eur ParI Assembly Doc No 10506, ~~ 7-8 (Apr 22, 2005). See generally
Alastair Mowbray, The Consideration of Gender in the Process ofAppointingJudges to the European Court of
Human Rights, 8 Hum Rts L Rev 549 (2008) (discussing the legislative history of the sex
representation requirements).
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effectiveness" of the ECHR to address the issue of under-representation of
women on the Court. 134 Another committee linked the mandate of the human
rights court to the presence of women judges, arguing that "the Court risks
losing credibility if it is not seen to be fighting gender-based discrimination in its
own ranks.,,135 Although the ECHR issued an Advisory Opinion in February
2008 stating that the Parliament could not reject a list for failure to include a
female candidate,136 Malta ultimately submitted a list with a female candidate. 137
In addition to the Assembly's requirements, the Rules of Court require it to
"pursue a policy aimed at securing a balanced representation of the sexes" in
selecting the President, Vice President, and Sections of the Court. 138
Outside the realm of human rights and international criminal courts,
scholars of the IC], too, question whether its most frequent litigants should be
better represented on the bench.139 In other words, general geographic diversity
is not enough; what matters is whether the regions that include the states that
most frequently utilize the Court are adequately reflected on the Court's bench.
Similarly, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding allows developing
states that are parties to a dispute to request a panel member from a developing
state. 14O Again, the emphasis is not on geographic diversity per se, but rather, on
the inclusion of an adjudicator from a developing state.
Representation of the various groups that make up society on the judicial
bench is a common theme in the domestic context as well, at least among
Western states. For example, a European Union study of women and the
134

Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Candidates for the European
Court of Human Rights, Eur Pari Assembly Doc No 9963 (Oct 7, 2003).

135

Opinion of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Candidates to the
European Court of Human Rights, Eur Pari Assembly Doc No 10048 Gan 26, 2004).

136

137

138

139

140

Advisory Opinion on Certain LegalQuestions Concerning the Lists of Candidates Submitted with a View to the
Election of Judges to the Europea// Court of Human Rights, 49 Eur Hum Rts Rep 33, ~ 54 (Grand
Chamber 2009).
See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Third Part of the 2010 Ordinary Session,
Election of a Judge to the European Court of Human Rights Gune 22, 2010), online at
http:// assembly.coe.int/ CommitteeDocs/201 0/201 00622_ElectionMalte.pdf (visited Oct 13,
2011).
European Court of Human
Rights, Rules of Court,
Rule
14, online at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/Other+texts/Rules+of+Court/
(visited Oct 13, 2011). See also id at Rule 25 ("The composition of Sections shall be
geographically and gender balanced and shall reflect the different legal systems among the
Contracting Parties.").
Georges Abi-Saab, Ensuring the Best Bench: W0's of Selecting Judges, in Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee,
eds, Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the ICj/UNITAR
Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Court, 165, 174--75 (Martinus Nijhoff 1997).
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 ILM at
1232 (cited in note 100).

672

Vol. 12 No.2

Sex on the Bench

Grossman

judiciary asserts: "The balanced participation of women and men in decisionmaking is considered crucial to the legitimacy of representative and advisory
bodies, and therefore also of our European democracies.,,141 Judge Gladys
Kessler, a United States judge and former president of the National Association
of Women Judges, asserted that "the ultimate justification for deliberately
seeking judges of both sexes and all colors and backgrounds is to keep the
public'S trust. The public must perceive its judges as fair, impartial and
representative of the diversity of those who are being judged.,,142 In Justice
Ginsburg's words, in 2009, "it just doesn't look right" to have only one woman
on the United States Supreme Court. 143 Similarly, an Israeli author argues on
behalf of a "reflective judiciary" in Israeli society inclusive of women judges:
"The judiciary is a branch of government, not merely a dispute-resolution
institution. As such, it cannot be composed in total disregard of society.... Due
regard must be given to the consideration of fair reflection."I44
Perhaps the strongest argument for sex representation on international
courts is that women make up almost half the world's population.145 Severe
under-representation of women, or over-representation of men, thus threatens
legitimacy. This argument becomes even more compelling when female
presidents have served in countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Finland, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Switzerland, among others. 146 Over 20 percent of
supreme court judges in Albania, Argentina, Austria, Costa Rica, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Honduras, Ireland, Norway, the Philippines, Switzerland, and
Uganda were women in 2008. 147 Women have also served as ministers of justice
in countries including Barbados, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, Honduras, Norway,
Peru, Suriname, and the United States. 148 Surely a female candidate worthy of an

141

Anasagasti and Wuiame, Women and Decision-Making at 7 (cited in note 63).

142

Wilson, 28 Osgoode Hall L J at 518 (cited in note 60).

143

Bazelon, The Place of Women at MM22 (cited in note 58).

of R£jlective Judiciary,

144

Shimon Shetreet, The Doctrinal R£asoningjor More Women Judges: The Principle
Shimon Shetreet, ed, Women in Law 183,190 (Kluwer 1998).

145

See World Population Prospects (cited in note 4).

146

These include Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, Dilma Rousseff, Michelle Bachelet Jeria, Laura
Chinchilla Miranda, Tarja Kaarina Halonen, Vigdis Finnbogad6ttir, Pratibha Patil, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, Mary Robinson, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Dalia Grybauskaite,
Maria Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Chandrika Kumaratunga, and Ruth Dreifuss.

147

United Nations Development Fund for Women, Who Answers to Women? Gender & Accountability,
*78, online at http://www.unifem.org/progress/2008/publication.html (visited Sept 22, 2011).

148

Mia Mottley (Attorney General), Nilda Copa Condori, Kim Campbell, Helga Pedersen, Vera Sofia
Rubi, Elisabeth Schweigaard Selmer, Rosario Fernandez Figueroa, Yvonne Reine Antoinette
Raveles-Resida, and Janet Reno (Attorney General). See Worldwide Guide to Women in
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international judgeship can be found in countries where women are presidents,
judges of the highest courts, and government rrurusters. Sex unrepresentativeness threatens the normative legitimacy of international courts
because these institutions wield public authority,149 yet they fail to reflect fairly
those affected by their decisions.
While sex representation may be important to normative legitimacy
because representation is an important democratic value, representation qua
representation may sometimes harm perceptions of justified authority, or
sociological legitimacy, for some constituencies. For example, although several
constituencies pushed hard for women judges on the ICC, there was no public
uproar over the entirely male ITLOS bench for the fifteen year period from its
founding until October 2011. Even during the negotiations over the ICC, some
states were hostile, ambivalent, or silent about including women judges on the
bench. 1so As one respondent to a European Union study reminded interviewers:
''Justice was handed down by men and the fact of being male was an important
component of the professional model. Authority was linked to physical
presence, a powerful voice and the fear inspired."151 A different respondent to
the study asserted that "[t]he entry into the judiciary of women en masse could
introduce uncertainty as to the image of its authority figures.,,1s2 The world
might view a World Court with thirteen women and two men as less
authoritative than the current ratio.
Further, when constituencies perceive that a sex-representation
requirement is inconsistent with other qualifications required by a court's statute,
the perceived authority of a court may decline. For example, in its rejection of
the Parliamentary Assembly's refusal to consider Malta's all-male list of
candidates, the ECHR asserted that the individual qualifications requirements of
the European Convention on Human Rights are "of considerable importance
for the Court, in the sense that it is vital to its authority and the quality of its
decisions that it be made up of members of the highest legal and moral

Leadership, Female Ministers of Intenor, Home Affairs, Secun'ty, Civil Deftnce and Police, online at
http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Security_ministers.htm (visited Oct 13, 2011).
149

See generally von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name? (cited in note 11) (discussing the
applicability of democratic principles to international courts).

150

For example, China took no strong position with regard to the sex representation provision of the
Rome Statute. Adoptzon of a Convention on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court at 212
(cited in note 87). The representative from the United Arab Emirates thought that subparagraphs
(d) and (e) should be deleted, stating, "that did not mean that the Court would not have access to
the necessary expertise on questions of sexual or gender violence." Id at 216.

151

Anasagasti and Wuiame, Women and Decision-Making at 25 (cited in note 63).

152

Id.

674

Vol. 12 No.2

Grossman

Sex on the Bench

standing."IS3 Interestingly, similar critiques are leveled at sex-neutral equitable
distribution requirements: some argue that geographic diversity requirements
resulted in lower staff quality in the United Nations Secretariat. ls4
Nevertheless, it is worth questioning whether the qualifications argument
holds water for the international judiciary, especially when women serve in high
positions, including as presidents, ministers, and judges, around the globe.
Further, perhaps perceptions of authority linked to male characteristics will
change as women increasingly take on positions of power. Given the importance
of including female judges on international courts for normative legitimacy,
those who make these arguments bear the burden of proving no adequate
female candidates are available.

***
Representation is an important democratic value and states' decisions to
require representation of groups transcending state boundaries suggest it is
increasingly important to the legitimacy of international courts. Severe underrepresentation of women-and other groups-on the bench undermines
normative legitimacy. Nonetheless, women's presence may harm perceptions of
authority for some constituencies.

VI. CONCLUSION
More international courts make decisions that affect our lives today than
ever before. ISS They define the scope of our human rights, and they decide who
will be held accountable for what kind of international crimes and how they shall
be punished. They determine which communities will benefit from the
exploitation of oil in disputed parts of the ocean, whether environmental harm
has taken place, and what, if any, reparations must be paid and to whom. They
play an integral role in defining fair trade practices and determining whether
natural resources belong to the people within a state or to multinational
corporations. The increasing judicialization of international dispute resolution
IS6
It also
requires serious inquiry into the legitimacy of these institutions.
153

154

Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists
~ 42 (cited in note 136).

of Candidates, 49

Eur Hum Rts Rep at

See William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Stuqy
Distribution, 39 ColumJ Transnad L 299,369-70 (2001).

of Equitable

155

See generally The Project on International Courts and Tribunals, The International Judiciary in
Context, online at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf (visited
Oct 13, 2011) (listing numerous international courts and quasi-judicial institutions).

156

See generally Schneider, 2006 J Disp Resol 119 (cited in note 15) (discussing the increased use of
international courts to decide disputes between states); Koskenniemi, The IdeololJ of International
Acjjudication at 152 (cited in note 11). See also von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name? at *43
(cited in note 11).
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mandates more careful investigation of international judges' identities and the
sources of their legitimacy. 157
This Article seeks to advance our understanding of international courts'
legitimacy and the relationship between legitimacy and who sits on the bench. In
essence, this Article asks whether we should care that few women sit on
international court benches. Its thesis is that we should. The Article proposes
that under-representation of one sex affects normative legitimacy because it
endangers impartiality and introduces bias when men and women approach
judging differently. Even if men and women do not "think differently," a sex unrepresentative bench harms sociological legitimacy for constituencies who
believe they think differently nonetheless. For groups traditionally excluded
from international lawmaking or historically subjected to discrimination,
inclusion likely strengthens sociological legitimacy, while continued exclusion
perpetuates conclusions about unfairness. Finally, sex representation is
important to normative legitimacy of international courts because representation
is an important democratic value, although it may endanger sociological
legitimacy for constituencies who associate authority with male judges or if
women are unqualified or perceived as less qualified.
Although its focus is on sex representation, this Article gives rise to
questions about other kinds of representation. Which other groups that
transcend state boundaries deserve representation on benches and panels? What
about the poor, the disabled, children, and indigenous peoples? What about nongovernmental organizations or multinational corporations? What other groups
have we not yet identified? To what extent does the composition of the bench
required for legitimacy depend on the court's subject matter jurisdiction? In
other words, is it important to include indigenous members on human rights
courts but not the WTO's Appellate Body?
Finally, if women judges do matter to the legitimacy of international courts,
as this Article proposes, we must seriously consider what practical steps must be
taken to increase the number of credible female candidates for judicial offices
around the world. What, if anything, about the selection process for
international judges makes women less likely to become international court
judges? Should world citizens, rather than just states-the classical international
law actor-be involved in choosing judges on international courts?158 Should
committees of experts appointed by states, rather than states themselves,
nominate candidates? As more cases with serious implications are decided in

157
158

See Romano, 39 NYU J Inti L & Pol at 800 (cited in note 15).
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, 23 Eur J Inti L at *45 (cited in note 11) (suggesting that
"international adjudication in the postnational constellation should be guided by the idea of world
citizenship").
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international courts, calls for sex and other kinds of representation are likely to
grow louder. Both men and women interested in protecting international courts
and the law they interpret and apply would do well to heed these calls.
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TABLE 1.

Statistics on Women's Participation on International
Courts

International
Court

Court of
Justice

International
Tribunal for
the Law of
the Sea

European

African
Court of

Court of

Human and

American
Court of

Inter-

Justice

Peoples'
Rights

Human
Rights

European
Court of
Human
Rights

No.

2/15

0/21 ii

4/27iii

2/11 iv

2/7 v

17/46 vi

Wornen/

=13%i

=0%

=15%

=18%

=29%

=37%

0/24 vii

n/a viii

n/a ix

n/a x

1/8 xi

list

=13%

unavailable
xii

Total
(permanent)
No.
Women/
Total

=0%

(in 2009)

(ad hoc or
ad litem)
No. Women

2/39

0/21

4/27

2/11

3/15

17/46

/Total

=5%

=0%

=15%

=18%

=20%

=37%

(permanent

(ad hoc
unavailable)

and ad hoc)
Percentage
Women
Since

0/35 xiv

6/85 xv

2/13 xvi

4/32 xvii

26/147 xviii

=0%

=7%

= 15%

=13%

=18%

2/155 xix

0/7 u

n/a

n/a

1/66 xxi

=1%

=0%

=2%

ad hoc
unavailable

1945 xxii

1994uiii

1969 xxvi

1950 xxvii

3/100 xiii
=3%

Established
(permanent)
Percentage
Women
Since
Established
(ad hoc or
ad litem)
Year
Established

1952xxiv
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International
Court

International
Criminal Court

International

International

Criminal
Tribunal for the

Criminal
Tribunal for
Rwanda

Former
Yugoslavia

World Trade
Organization

Disputes

No. Women/

11/19 xxviii

1/16 xxix

3/13 xXX

3/7xxyj

Total

=58%

=6%

=23%

=43%

(permanent)
No. Women/
Total

Centre for the
Settlement of
Inyestment

n/a XXxll

(App Body)
n/a

5/12 xxxiii

3/11 xxyjv

4/24 xxxV

5/58 xxxvi

=42%

=27%

=17%

=9%

(ad hoc or

(panels)

ad litem)
No. Women

11/19

6/28

6/24

7/31

5/58

/Total

=58%

=21%

=25%

=23%

=9%

Percentage

12/27 xxxvii

7/46 xxxviii

7/40 xxxix

4/21 xl

n/a

Women Since

=44%

=15%

=18%

=19%

(permanent
and
ad hoc)

Established

(App Body)

(permanent)
Percentage
Women Since
Established

n/a

13/33 xli

5/14 xlii

94/586 xliii

32/582 xliv

=39%

=36%

=16%

=6%

(panels)

(ad hoc or
ad litem)
Year

1998 x1v

1993 xlvi

1994xlvii

Established
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Courts

Permanent women judges for the WTO are Appellate Body judges. No percentage is listed for
ICSID because all arbitrations are ad hoc.
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Courts

International Court of Justice (lCJ), Members, online
index.php?pl=1&p2=2&p3=2 (visited Feb 27, 2011).

at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/

ii

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (lTLOS), Members, online at http://www.itlos.org/
index.php?id=96 (visited May 25, 2010).

iii

Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), Members, online at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcms/Jo2_7026/ (visited June 1,2010).

iv

African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights(ACHPR), Judges oj the Court, online at
http://www.african-court.org/en/court/judges/ (visited May 23, 2010).

The numbers for the ICJ are from February 27, 2011.
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), Composition of the Court, online at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/composicion.cfm?&CFID=1266095&CFfOKEN=80315040 (visited
May 23, 2010).
vi

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Composition of the Court, online at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/]udges+of+the+Court/
(visited May 24, 2010).

vii

There were no women serving as judges ad hoc in the eleven cases pending before the IC] on
October 5, 2011. ICJ, Current Justices Ad Hoc, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?pl=1&p2=5&p3=1 (visited Feb 27, 2011).

viii

ITLOS, Judges Ad Hoc, online at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=18 (visited May 23, 2011);
ITLOS, Docket; List of Pending Cases and Current Status, online at http://www.itlos.org/
index.php?id=34 (visited May 23,2010).

ix

The Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union does not allow for ad hoc or ad litem
judges. Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, O]C 83
(2010).

x

Neither the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment
of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights nor the Interim Rules of Court mention the
appointment of ad hoc or ad litem judges. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art
14(2), (3), OAU Doc CAB/LEG/665 (1998) (protocol to the Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights); ACHPR, Court Establishment, online at http://www.african-court.org/en/basicdocuments/ court-establishment/ (visited Nov 22, 2011).

xi

List provided by the IACHR onJune 3,2010 (on file with author).

xii

Although Rule 29 of the Rules of the ECHR permits the appointment of ad hoc judges, the Court
possesses no list of individuals who have been appointed as ad hoc judges. According to the
ECHR library, such a list would contain many thousand names aune 2, 2010) (email on ftle with
author). Consequently, this statistic is not included.

xiii

ICJ, Members (cited in note i).

xiv

ITLOS, Members (cited in note ii).

xv

Former members can be found at ECJ, Former Members, online at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcmsIJ02_7014/ (visited May 23, 2010).
Derived from list of judges elected in 2006 and 2008 by the African Union. African Union, List of
the Judges of the African Court on Human and People's Rights Elected by the 13th Ordinary Session of the
Executive Council in JulY 2006 (translation from original French), online at http://www.africaunion.org/ root/ auf organs/ Court_of-Justice_en.htm (visited June 2, 2010); African Union, List of
the Judges of the African Court on Human and People's Rights Elected by the 13th Ordinary Session of the
Executive Council in JulY 2008, online at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/
CourcoCJ ustice_en.htm (visited] une 2, 2010).

xvii

List of judges provided by the IACHR on June 3, 2010 (on ftle with author).

xviii

Between the time this list was generated and May 24, 2010, Judge Guido Raimondi was
appointed. ECHR, Composition of the Court (cited in note vi).

xix

When individuals served on more than one case as judge ad hoc, they were counted once for each
time they served. See note vii.

xx

ITLOS,Judges Ad Hoc (cited in note viii).

xxi

List of ad hoc judges provided by the IACHR on June 3, 2010 (on ftle with author). Each judge
was counted once for each time he or she was named as a judge ad hoc in any phase of a case.

xxii

ICJ, The Court, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 (visited Aug 15, 2010).
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xxiii

Although established in 1982, ITLOS became operational in 1996. ITLOS, General Information,
online at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=8&L=0 (visited Aug 15, 2010).

xxiv

The ECJ was created in 1952 and became the judicial organ of all three European Communities in
1957. Project on International Courts, online at http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ECJ.htmi
(visited Nov 20, 2011).

xxv

The Protocol came into force in 2004, and judges were first elected in January 2006. Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (cited in note x).

xxvi

Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights (Nov 22, 1969), 1144
UN Treaty Ser 123 (1979).

xxvii

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art 20 (Nov 4,
1950),213 UN Treaty Ser 221 (1950). Although established in 1950, the Court began functioning
in 1959. Project on International Courts, online at http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ECHR.html
(visited Nov 20, 2011).

xxviii

International Criminal Court (ICC), judges, online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Structure+of+the+Court/ Chambers/The+J udges/ (visited June 1, 2010).

xxix

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (I CTY) , Judges, online
http://www.icty.org/sid/151 (visited May 22, 2010).

at

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Chambers, online at http://www.unictr.org/
tabid/l03/default.aspx (visited June 3, 2010).
xxxi

World Trade Organization (WTO), Dispute Settlement Appellate Bot!J Members, online at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (visited May 26,
2010).

xxxii

There are no permanent judges on International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), only ad hoc panels. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Convention, Regulations and Rules, 15 ICSID (World Bank Apr 2006) (ICSID Convention).

xxxiii

ICTY,Judges (cited in note xxix).

xxxiv

ICTR, Chambers (cited in note xxx).

xxxv

Based on List of Panels Composed in 2009 provided by Enquiries Section of WTO on June 7,
2010 (on me with author).

xxxvi

I divided the number of times women were appointed to sit on panels by the total number of
arbitrators appointed for cases registered in 2009 for which panels had been appointed by May 23,
2010. Individuals who served on more than one panel were counted each time they served on a
panel. ICSID, List oj Concluded Cases, online at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionV al= ListConcluded (visited May 26, 201 0).
ICSID, List oj Pending Cases, http://icsid.woridbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (visited May 26, 2010).

xxxvii

ICC, judges (cited in note xxviii).

xxxviii These

statistics are derived from a document provided by the ICTY listing the names of judges
who have served in both ad litem and permanent positions. The document is dated October 20,
2009 (on me with author).

xxxix

These statistics were obtained by counting the male and female judges listed in the ICTR Annual
Reports. ICTR, Annual Reports to the General AssemblY, online at http://unictr.org/tabid/l17 /
default.aspx (visited June 4,2010).

xl

WTO, Dispute Settlement Appellate Bot!J Members (cited in note xxxi).

xli

ICTY, judges (cited in note xxix).

xlii

These statistics were obtained by counting the male and female judges listed in the ICTR Annual
Reports. See note xxxix.
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xliii

This was determined by adding up the number of times a woman served on a WTO panel and by
dividing by the total number of WTO panels from January 1, 1995 to December 15, 2009. List of
Panelists by Nationality Oanuary 1, 1995 to December 15, 2009) provided by Enquiries Section of
WTO on January 20, 201 0 (on ftle with author).

xliv

The following women have served on concluded cases at ICSID: Rosalyn Higgins (British, one
time), Marie Madeleine Mborantsuo (Gabonese, one time), Maureen Brunt (Australian, one time),
Maureen Ponsonby (British, one time), Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (Swiss, twelve times),
Antonias Dimolitsa (Greek, two times), Brigitte Stern (French, ten times), Carolyn B. Lamm
(American, one time), Sara Ordonez Noriega (Colombian, one time), Catherine Kessedjian
(French, one time), and Sandra Morelli Rico (Colombian, one time). The statistics are drawn from
ICSID, List of Concluded Cases (cited in note xxxvi).

xlv

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), 37 ILM 999 (2002).

xlvi

ICTY, About the ICIY, online at http://www.icty.org/ sections/ AbouttheICTY (visited Nov 20,
2011).

xlvii

ICTR, About ICIR· General Information, online at http://www.unictr.org/ AboutICTR/
Generalinformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (visited Nov 20, 2011).

xlviii

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (April 15, 1994),
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994).

xlix

ISCID, About ICSID, online at http://icsid.woridbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=AboutICSID_Home (visited Nov 20, 2011).
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